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The fixation requirement, once an intended instrument for added flexibility in 
copyrightability, has become an unworkable standard under modern copyright law.  
The last twenty-five years have witnessed a dramatic expansion in creative media.  
Developments in both digital media and contemporary art have challenged what it 
means to be fixed, and cases dealing with these works reveal how inapposite 
current interpretations of fixation are for these forms of expression.  Yet, getting 
fixation “right” is important, for it is often the juridical threshold over which idea 
becomes expression.  Thus, we must enable fixation to help define the parameters 
of creative expression while not discriminating against dynamic and digital works. 
In previous work, Steven Hetcher and I have identified problems with the 
fixation requirement as it applies to modern creative expression and have argued 
for changes that would amend the fixation requirement to better function in the 
modern era.1  This Essay furthers that argument.  As part of the Kernochan Center 
Symposium, “Copyright Outside the Box,” I argued that the transitory duration 
exclusion for copyrightability should be stricken from the definition of fixation to 
better enable it to reflect the parameters of modern creative expression.  Agnieszka 
Kurant’s art serves as an example of this need for change.  Removing the exclusion 
for transitory works, while maintaining the stability requirement, would retain the 
essence of the definition of fixation under the Copyright Act but enable application 
to modern forms of creative expression, including both contemporary art and 
digital works. 
Human creativity is an essential part of being human.  The United States 
Constitution reflects a commitment to fostering creativity by providing creators 
with exclusive rights over their creations for limited times.2  This remains true 
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 1. Megan M. Carpenter & Steven Hetcher, Function Over Form: Bringing the Fixation 
Requirement into the Modern Era, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221 (2014). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  The Supreme Court states that the “philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).   
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whether one adopts an incentive-based, utilitarian theory of intellectual property or 
a natural-rights theory of intellectual property.  A utilitarian theory of intellectual 
property reflects a belief that the public welfare will benefit from incentivizing 
creators to produce creative works—that people will have greater creative output, 
in both quantity and quality, if they are given some measure of control over the 
product of their creation.3  Utilitarian theory has been the dominant theory of 
intellectual property.4  A natural rights theory of intellectual property recognizes 
that creative activity is an essential part of being human.5  Creative works can be 
related to personhood, and an expression of individuality.6  A natural rights theory 
may also consider the ownership that can come from mixing one’s labor with the 
external world.7 
Art is not only intrinsic to our humanity; it is socially beneficial.8  Creative 
expression in all its varied forms in many ways defines who we are as a people.  
President Barack Obama has noted that we rely on the arts to remind us of the 
truths that connect us, and they play an important role in broadening our 
understanding of the world and telling our story.9  As stated in the mission of the 
National Endowment for the Arts:  “A great nation deserves great art.”10  And, 
while art is an accepted social good, it has constantly changing norms.  The 
dynamic nature of art is not incidental, but intrinsic.  Art does not stand still.  It 
 
 3. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–
51 (2012). 
 4. See id. (citing Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); 122 
CONG. REC. 2834 (1976) (statement of Sen. John McClellan); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability 
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2009); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989); Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 
330–31 (1945); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1597–99 (2003); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 697 (2001)). 
 5. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
 6. See Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 93 (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: The Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533 (1993).   
 8. As First Lady Michelle Obama stated, “The arts are not just a nice thing to have or to do if 
one has free time or can afford it.”  Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at the Ribbon Cutting 
Ceremony for the Metropolitan Museum of Art American Wing, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 18, 2009, 3:21 
PM), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-first-lady-ribbon-cutting-ceremony-metropolitan-
museum-art-american-wing [https://perma.cc/62TA-6S5U].  Our country’s infrastructure recognizes the 
importance of supporting the arts, including providing federal funding since President Roosevelt created 
the Public Works Art Project and the Federal Art Project.  The National Endowment for the Arts has, to 
date, given over four million dollars for various art projects.  MARTIN R. KALFATOVIC, THE NEW DEAL 
FINE ARTS PROJECTS:  A BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1933–1992 xxi–xxv (1994); see National Foundation on the 
Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, 79 Stat. 845, 846–47 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 951–60 (2012)); About the NEA, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, http://www.nea.gov/about/
index.html [https://perma.cc/74F3-UZSP] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).   
 9. Barack Obama, Presidential Proclamation, National Arts and Humanities Month, 2014, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/presidential-
proclamation-national-arts-and-humanities-month-2014 [https://perma.cc/HWJ4-L9JD].   
 10. NEA at a Glance, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, http://www.4uth.gov.ua/usa/
english/politics/agencies/nea.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZER-4RN3] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
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responds to the change and evolution in society over time.  It is, by definition, 
creative. 
Copyright law is also creative.  It has historically, and importantly, evolved in 
response to cultural development.11  While adaptation and evolution are necessary 
aspects of our legal system in general, they are imperative for copyright if it is to 
serve its essential function.  Copyright has accommodated change over time 
through expansion and changes in subject matter and form.12  The Supreme Court 
has stated that copyright law should not discriminate based on aesthetic judgment: 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of [particular creative expression] outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.  At the one extreme some works of genius would 
be sure to miss appreciation.  Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the 
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke.13 
Therefore, to the extent that copyright law discriminates among certain forms of 
creative expression for the purposes of determining the boundaries of copyright 
protection, it must be done with great caution. 
While artists are always going to push the envelope, copyright presently fails to 
promote modern creative expression in significant ways; it fails to adequately 
protect contemporary art that is not “fixed” according to current interpretations of 
the Copyright Act.  While copyright law relies upon fixation as a signifier of 
creative expression, the Copyright Act defines fixation in a way that is significantly 
narrower.  Fixation requires works to be able to be “perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”14  Many 
digital works, and contemporary works that incorporate elements of change over 
time, fall outside this definition because of the exclusion of works with transitory 
elements.  The work of Agnieszka Kurant, discussed later in this paper, is an 
excellent example of work that is recognized by art experts around the world as 
 
 11. For example, legislative history indicates that Congress intended to create a flexible definition 
of “works of authorship” that would neither “freeze the scope of copyrightable . . . technology [nor] 
allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present congressional intent.”  H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-176, at 51 (1976); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 
OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).   
 12. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1865, 16 Stat. 198 (granting copyright protection to photographs); 
Act of August 24, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 37 Stat. 488 (providing express protection for motion 
pictures); Act of June 3, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-84, 63 Stat. 153 (broadening compliance requirements 
with manufacturing clause in light of post-World War II conditions in Europe); Act of July 17, 1952, 
Pub. L. No. 82-575, 61 Stat. 653 (granting right of public performance to authors of nondramatic literary 
works); Act of October 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (granting protection to sound 
recordings). 
 13. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 14. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) [hereinafter 1976 Copyright Act]:  
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or 
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.  A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, 
is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously 
with its transmission. 
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being of great societal value, but yet is often not copyrightable per se because of the 
use of dynamic elements in the creative expression.15 
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, fixation was a de facto, rather than de jure, 
requirement for copyrightability.16  Copyrightable works under prior statutes were 
enumerated by medium rather than expressive category, and all were automatically 
fixed due to the specific medium involved.  The 1790 Act applied to maps, charts, 
and books.17  In 1831, the list expanded to include musical compositions.18  Several 
other works were added in 1909, including periodicals, dramatic compositions, 
prepared speeches, photographs, prints, drawings, and works of art.19  Formality 
requirements further ensured fixation; embodying a work in some kind of physical 
form was necessary for federal copyright protection.20 
Broadening copyright protection to encompass new forms of creative expression 
has been a consistent and driving force behind the evolution of copyright law, and 
conversations about encouraging new forms of media began taking place in the 
legislative debate on amendments to the 1909 Act.21  Concerns were raised that 
copyright requirements inhibited the protection and production of works that failed 
to be embodied in some permanent form.22  Accordingly, the House of 
Representatives considered a proposal to allow copyright for works “in any 
medium or form or by any method through which the thought of the author may be 
expressed,”23 and later for “all the writings of an author, whatever the mode or 
form of their expression, and all renditions and interpretations of a performer and/
or interpreter of any musical, literary, dramatic work, or other compositions, 
 
 15. For examples and discussion of Agnieszka Kurant’s work, see Agnieszka Kurant—Works, 
TANYA BONAKDAR GALLERY, http://www.tanyabonakdargallery.com/artists/agnieszka-kurant/series-
works_10 [https://perma.cc/5R6E-CNDD] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016); Sabine Russ, Artists in 
Conversation: Agnieszka Kurant, BOMB MAGAZINE 131 (Spring 2015), http://bombmagazine.org/
article/171633/agnieszka-kurant [https://perma.cc/MX52-FU6T]; Agnieszka Kurant, GUGGENHEIM 
COLLECTION ONLINE,  http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/collections/collection-online/artists/bios/
12212/Agnieszka%20Kurant [https://perma.cc/WZ4X-5HDQ] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016); Ken Johnson, 
Agnieszka Kurant: Variables, Art in Review, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/10/arts/design/agnieszka-kurant-variables.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/JR67-9QAC].   
 16. See Copyright Act of 1909, c. 320, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter 1909 
Copyright Act] (including no fixation language); Act of May 31, 1790, ch.15, 1 Stat. 124 (hereinafter 
1790 Copyright Act) (also including no fixation language).   
 17. These works were all fixed automatically due to the nature of the media.  See 1790 Copyright 
Act.   
 18. Before this amendment, musical compositions had been protected as books.  Copyright Act of 
1831, 4 Stat. 436.   
 19. 1909 Copyright Act § 5.   
 20. Id.  Copyright could be secured for works not reproduced in copies for sale by deposit of an 
identifying reproduction of the work with the Copyright Office.  See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY NO. 28 
COPYRIGHT IN CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS 96 (Comm. Print 1961).   
 21. Laura A. Heymann, How to Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the Copyright/
Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 846 (2009–10) (citing S. 3008, 88th Cong. (1964) 
(introduced by Sen. John McClellan); H.R. 11947, 88th Cong. (1964) (introduced by Rep. Emanuel 
Celler); H.R. 12354, 88th Cong. (1964) (introduced by Rep. William St. Onge)). 
 22. Heymann, supra note 21, at 844.  
 23. H.R. 6990, 71st Cong. § 1 (1929).   
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whatever the mode or form of such renditions, performances, or interpretations.”24  
In 1976, Congress acted on these concerns by making the fixation requirement 
explicit to eliminate “artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions” among 
creative works, and cover any new forms or media  “now known or later 
developed.”25 
Despite the fact that the fixation requirement was intended to eliminate these 
artificial distinctions, important segments of contemporary creative expression 
remain outside the ambit of copyrightability precisely because of the statutory 
language.  It is perhaps no surprise that we again need to see an evolution in the 
legal framework of copyright law.  Copyright law has historically adapted to 
significant cultural and technological changes in creative society, and it must do so 
now through a change in the meaning and application of the term “fixation” under 
the Copyright Act. 
If fixation effectively defines the parameters of creative expression, then it 
should seek to reflect the reality of creative expression.  The inclusion of fixation in 
the 1976 Act is an example of this—the dynamic nature of copyright seeking to 
adapt to contemporary understandings of creative expression.26  The fixation 
requirement was added when the Copyright Act moved away from a laundry list of 
protected works and to a broader, more inclusive set of categories.27  Within this 
broader construct, fixation was intended to delineate idea from expression, and not 
make copyrightability dependent on form.28  The 1976 Act demonstrated a shift in 
focus to the function of expression, rather than the form.29 
Courts are beginning to wrestle with this problem.  Whether they recognize it 
explicitly, cases dealing both with contemporary art and digital works are 
struggling to define the parameters of copyrightability vis-à-vis the exclusion for 
works that incorporate transitory elements.  The Seventh Circuit highlighted the 
tension between contemporary art and copyright law in Kelley v. Chicago Park 
District when it held that a sculpture made up of plant material was ineligible for 
copyright protection in part because it was not fixed:  “The essence of a garden is 
its vitality, not its fixedness.”30  The court noted that the work was unfixed because 
of the inherently changeable nature of its constituent elements.31  Because the work 
changed over time, it was “not a fixed copy of the gardener’s intellectual 
property.”32  While the court stated that it was not “suggesting that copyright 
attaches only to works that are static or fully permanent . . . or that artists who 
 
 24. H.R. 10632, 74th Cong. § 4 (1936). 
 25. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976).  
 26. Id.  Replacing the publication requirement with a fixation requirement enabled federal 
copyright law to reach a new class of artistic works.  A statutory fixation requirement enabled copyright 
law to do away with the “artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions” that made copyright protection 
dependent upon the form of expression.   
 27. 1976  Copyright Act § 102(a). 
 28. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52. 
 29. Id. at 51–52. 
 30. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 305 (7th Cir. 2011).   
 31. Id. at 304–05. 
 32. Id. at 305–06.   
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incorporate natural or living elements in their work can never claim copyright,” its 
holding unnecessarily limited the fixation language to media that are essentially 
static.33 
At least one district court in a different jurisdiction has relied on the Kelley 
holding to deny copyright to not just living, but perishable works.  In Kim Seng Co. 
v. J & A Importers, a district court extended the Kelley holding, supporting the idea 
that any physically impermanent form is insufficiently fixed for copyrightability, 
claiming that “[l]ike a garden, which is ‘inherently changeable,’ a bowl of 
perishable food will, by its terms, ultimately perish.”34  The court reasoned that the 
fixation requirement serves the purpose of preserving evidence of creation and 
infringement.35  However, there are multiple reasons this reasoning is inapt:  First, 
copyright protection does not degrade in conjunction with the degradation of its 
subject works.36  Destruction of a work after it has been created does not affect the 
status of the underlying copyright.  Second, works that are unfixed according to the 
Copyright Act can infringe; only the reproduction right requires unauthorized 
“copies or phonorecords.”37 
The exclusion for works that incorporate transitory elements creates problems 
for digital technologies as well.  The difficult question of fixation as applied to 
RAM technologies illustrates this problem well, as addressed in both the Ninth and 
Second Circuit Courts.  The Ninth Circuit first confronted this problem when it 
considered what constituted a “copy” in MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, Inc.38  
The court noted that the fixation requirement includes both an embodiment 
requirement and a duration requirement, and held that the copy of a work made in 
RAM was sufficient for fixation, despite the fact that it may exist for mere seconds 
and would “only be a temporary fixation.”39  The fact that the copy was 
impermanent and would be lost when the computer is turned off did not defeat 
fixation for purposes of creating a copy.  More recently, in Cartoon Network LP v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc., the Second Circuit held that loading information into RAM 
does not necessarily create a fixed copy; in this case, the works were not fixed 
 
 33. Id. at 305. 
 34. Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Imps., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  The court 
explained that a key purpose behind the fixation requirement is “to ease[] problems of proof of creation 
and infringement.”  Id.  For a discussion of why this purpose is a red herring, see Carpenter & Hetcher, 
supra note 1, at 2239–40, 2246–49.  See also Evan Brown, Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours 
of the Fixation Requirement in Copyright Law, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 17, 30 (2014)  
 35. Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (citing William Patry, Patry on Copyright § 3:22). 
 36. Carpenter & Hetcher, supra note 1, at 2246.  
 37. 1976 Copyright Act § 106.  For a detailed discussion on the purposes of the fixation 
requirement, see Carpenter & Hetcher, supra note 1, at 2236–51. 
 38. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).   
 39. Id. at 518–19.  The Ninth Circuit quoted the court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula 
International, Inc.:   
RAM can be simply defined as a computer component in which data and computer programs can 
be temporarily recorded. Thus, the purchaser of [software] desiring to utilize in his computer all 
of the programs on the diskette could arrange to copy [it] into RAM.  This would only be a 
temporary fixation.  It is a property of RAM that when the computer is turned off, the copy of the 
programs recorded in RAM is lost. 
  Apple Computer v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
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because they were in the buffers for no more than 1.2 seconds before being 
automatically overwritten.40  Other cases involving digital fixation illuminate 
further problems with the duration requirement.  Some courts have found fixation 
to exist from a mere description of the work.  Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc. held that 
even a descriptive fixation may be sufficient in the context of an audiovisual 
display; fixation can result from a description that is “in sufficient detail to enable 
the work to be performed from that description.”41  The court in Torah Soft Ltd. v. 
Drosnin followed this reasoning, finding that fixation was satisfied by a repetitive 
and identical sequence.42 
As technology continues to advance and a greater diversity of creative 
expression occurs online, courts will be faced with the increasingly difficult, if not 
arbitrary, task of drawing some line between fixed and unfixed pieces of 
information.  The permanence traditionally associated with fixation simply does not 
apply to much of digital media.  In any given analysis, the question quickly moves 
away from whether or not the work is of transitory duration and toward a 
consideration of how much transitory duration is acceptable within the parameters 
of copyright. 
We would better reflect the principles of copyright law and the modern reality of 
creative expression by removing the transitory duration language from the fixation 
requirement.  Important strains of contemporary art aren’t protected by the 
Copyright Act because they incorporate natural or dynamic elements in their 
expression.  Art that includes natural media will often be excluded from 
copyrightability under the definition of fixation.  As an example, I will consider the 
art of Agnieszka Kurant, the artist featured in the Columbia Symposium, 
“Copyright Outside the Box.”43  Kurant’s work is exemplary of this problem.  Her 
art 
investigates the ways in which the immaterial and imaginary such as fictions, rumors, 
and phantoms influence political and economic systems of the contemporary world. 
Bridging the gap between fiction and reality, the invisible and tangible, past and 
present, her work analyzes hybrid and shifting status of objects as they relate to 
complex relationships between value, aura, authorship, distribution, production, 
distribution and ownership. Weaving together elements of history, geography, 
science, literature, and film and analyzing collective intelligence, immaterial labor, 
mutations of memes, manipulations of collective consciousness or the editing process 
as an aesthetic and political act Kurant probes the “unknown unknowns” of 
knowledge, or gaps in logic, in ways that both confuse and expand upon our 
understandings of the real and the imaginary.44 
 
 40. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d. Cir. 2008).   
 41. Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 42. Torah Soft, Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).   
 43. This conference was hosted by the Kernochan Center for Law, Media, and the Arts on 
October 2, 2015.  More information about the event, including an archive of presentations, can be found 
at Kernochan Center Annual Symposium, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, http://web.law.columbia.edu/
kernochan/copyright-outside-box [http://perma.cc/N9U7-ZRH4] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).   
 44. Agnieszka Kurant Biography, TANYA BONAKDAR GALLERY, http://
www.tanyabonakdargallery.com/artists/agnieszka-kurant/modal/bio [http://perma.cc/8L46-MK6F] (last 
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There are strong conceptual and dynamic elements to Kurant’s work.  It is often 
in constant transformation and shifts its status and meaning in different ways from 
the time of its creation.45  It often shifts forms and formats depending on different 
quasi-fictional or unexpected factors.46  For example, in her work, The End of 
Signature, displayed at the Guggenheim Museum in 2015, Kurant collected 
signatures from visitors to the museum and averaged them into one collective 
signature that evolved over time as more signatures were collected and scanned.47  
Museum visitors signed a piece of paper and fed it into a slot in the wall, where it 
was scanned and integrated by a computer into all other signatures, creating an 
average signature that an autopen machine repeatedly printed on new pieces of 
paper.  The collective signature was projected prominently onto the exterior of the 
Guggenheim Museum so that it was visible from Fifth Avenue, and it evolved 
before the public eye.48 
Another example is Kurant’s invited piece in the Frieze Projects in London, her 
dynamic exhibition involving live parrots.49  She presented a trio of trained parrots 
that had been isolated soon after birth and trained by the head of the Society of 
Talking Bird Owners, Marek Żyłkowski, to speak an alternate language—in this 
case, dog-barking.50  During the art fair, the birds heard human voices and 
civilization; people began talking to the birds and in front of the birds, and there 
was ambient sound of (dis)organized society and urban life.51  The language the 
birds had spoken dissolved and fell into individual parts as they began to assimilate 
the sounds they were hearing.52  In three days, the birds’ barking language had 
broken down and they had developed other ways of communicating. 
Kurant’s work does not sit at the fringes of contemporary art.  Her work has 
garnered worldwide acclaim, including exhibitions at the Guggenheim and the 
Museum of Modern Art in New York, the Palais de Tokyo in Paris, and the Tate 
Modern in London.53  She represented Poland at the Venice Biennale 12th 
International Architecture Exhibition (2010) and participated in the Performa 
Biennial in New York (2013 and 2009), Moscow Biennale (2007), Bucharest 
Biennale (2008), and 2nd Ural Biennial (2012).54 
Insofar as Agnieszka Kurant’s work incorporates elements of process in its 
 
visited Feb. 2, 2016).   
 45. See id.; see also Guggenheim, Storylines: Agnieszka Kurant, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2015), https:/
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=pa7Jdf91dWU [http://perma.cc/WF9L-X4GW]; Russ, supra note 15; 
Johnson, supra note 15.  
 46. Agnieszka Kurant: Life and Work, CULTURE.PL (Oct. 14, 2015), http://culture.pl/en/artist/
agnieszka-kurant [http://perma.cc/A2PZ-XL8D].   
 47. Guggenheim, Storylines, supra note 45.   
 48. Id.  
 49. See Frieze Projects 2008, Agnieszka Kurant, FRIEZE PROJECTS, http://
www.friezeprojects.org/commissions/detail/agnieszka_kurant/ [http://perma.cc/5DEZ-JEVL] (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
 50. Agnieszka Kurant: Life and Work, supra note 46.  
 51. Id.  
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product, it sits alongside renowned contemporary artists like Andy Goldsworthy,55 
Marina Abramovich,56 James Turrell,57 Damien Hirst,58 and Chapman Kelley.59  A 
significant segment of contemporary art essentially incorporates change over time 
and is thus uncopyrightable under the current construction of the fixation 
requirement.  Because of the transitory duration exclusion, these works aren’t 
copyrightable per se.  Yet, these works are “fixed” exactly as they’re supposed to 
be fixed.  They are in a form that is stable, and able to be perceived and reproduced. 
While artists will always push the boundaries of creative expression (and, certainly, 
copyright law), excluding from copyrightability forms of creative expression that 
include process as well as product discriminates against a significant movement in 
creative expression. 
Copyright law should stop ignoring the “fluidity of creativity” that is “inherent 
in any work under modern copyright law.”60  The sky will not fall, nor the entire 
universe become copyrightable, if the transitory duration exclusion is removed 
from the definition of copyright.  Works61 will still need to be fixed, to be 
 
 55. See ANDY GOLDSWORTHY DIGITAL CATALOGUE, http://www.goldsworthy.cc.gla.ac.uk [http:/
/perma.cc/LR6X-VMHS] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016); Arthur Lubow, 35 Who Made a Difference:  Andy 
Goldsworthy, SMITHSONIAN MAG (Nov. 2005), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/35-who-
made-a-difference-andy-goldsworthy-114067437/?no-ist [http://perma.cc/H588-VDAW]; Fresh Air:  
Sculptor Turns Rain, Ice, and Trees into “Ephemeral Works of Art,” NPR (Oct. 8, 2015) (transcript, 
“Interview Highlights”), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/08/446731282/sculptor-turns-rain-ice-and-trees-
into-ephemeral-works [https://perma.cc/WPB2-CQTH].   
 56. See MARINA ABRAMOVIC: THE ARTIST IS PRESENT (2010).  The Museum of Modern Art in 
New York held a retrospective of Marina Abramovic’s performance art in the spring of 2010, in which 
forty pieces were performed simultaneously.  This exhibition was popular in person—with over half a 
million visitors—and on the website, including more than 600,000 photos downloaded from the Flickr 
stream.  Holland Cotter, 700-Hour Silent Opera Reaches Finale at MoMa, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/arts/design/31diva.html [https://perma.cc/YK6E-N7GT].  
Information about this retrospective, The Artist Is Present, can be found online.  Exhibitions, MOMA, 
http://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/964?locale=en [http://perma.cc/V4M7-7NXV] (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2016).  
 57. See James Turrell, GUGGENHEIM (video interview transcript), http://www.guggenheim.org/
new-york/exhibitions/past/exhibit/4819  [http://perma.cc/8A67-YRFM] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016); 
James Turrell, ART21, http://www.art21.org/artists/james-turrell  [http://perma.cc/WRM2-725W] (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2016).  James Turrell has been a MacArthur and Guggenheim Fellow, and has won the 
Turner Prize.   
 58. See Hands up for Hirst, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/
16990811 [http://perma.cc/JD35-623R]; Peter Schjeldahl, Spot On: Damien Hirst’s Global Show, THE 
NEW YORKER (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/23/spot-on  [http://
perma.cc/9A8Y-3AJK]. 
 59. See CHAPMAN KELLEY, www.chapmankelley.com [http://perma.cc/8BD7-8UU3] (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2016); see also discussion of Kelley v. Chicago Park District, supra note 30.   
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 61. The definition of a work is unclear under copyright law, and neither legislative history nor 
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embodied in a form that “is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit [them] to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”62  There are incredibly 
important aspects of modern creative expression, digital and otherwise, that 
incorporate elements of change.  Removing the transitory duration exclusion will 
enable fixation to serve the valuable function of delineating the boundaries of a 
work—distinguishing idea from expression—while beginning to acknowledge the 
frequently dynamic nature of those works.  Art need not be static—art can be 
dynamic while still being fixable in that form.  The fixation requirement currently 
mischaracterizes art by focusing on the form of expression rather than its essential 
function—precisely what the requirement was created to avoid. 
 
 
works, a specific sequence) of intellectual responses that the sensory experience is designed to 
arouse in the mind of the audience.  An intended audience consists of people equipped with the 
minimum sensory and conceptual apparatus (e.g., language) needed to translate the sensory 
experience into the expressive experience designed by the author.  The purpose of the expressive 
experience, in turn, is to give rise to various expressive effects on the audience.  
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